When one reads the anguished outpourings of some yahapalanites about the restoration of the Rajapaksas to power, one thing that becomes obvious is that they are blaming everyone and everything else but themselves for their present plight. In reality however, they have only themselves to blame for the failure of their carefully planned and executed project. Viz. the following.
It was never about good governance to begin with
The yahapalana project despite its name was never about good governance. It was a conspiratorial power grab disguised as a campaign for good governance so as to mislead the public. The conspiracy to grab power by the UNP, JVP, TNA, SLMC and other elements took shape originally as an attempt to defeat the Rajapaksa led UPFA government in Parliament in 2007. At that time, there was no talk of yahapalanaya. It was simply a case of using the divisions in Parliament to defeat the UPFA government at the budget that year. If the budget had been defeated, a parliamentary election may have been held and the UPFA may not have been able to obtain a clear majority which would have enabled everyone else to gang up to run the parliamentary government. Thus even as a far back as 2007, the tendency was for everyone else to get together to defeat the Rajapaksas and grab power for themselves. It was only in 2014, that the name yahapalanaya was appended to that project to make it look like a quest for good governance and less like the cynical power grab that it was.
Even though some people portrayed this as a struggle to abolish the executive presidency, once the yahapalana President was elected to power, the rhetoric about abolishing the executive presidency diminished. Towards the end, some yahapalana political parties were saying that the executive presidency should be retained because it gave the minority communities a say and it enabled them to win the presidency by combining the overwhelming majority of the minority vote and a certain proportion of the majority community vote. Yahapalana ministers were openly saying that the presidential election was the easiest election for them to win. In fact after the 2015 parliamentary election, no yahapalana political party wanted to hold any election except the presidential election. So despite the yahapalanaya slogan, what happened in January 2015 was a power grab, a coup pure and simple albeit effected through the ballot.
Over-involvement of foreign parties
Even though what started as an attempted parliamentary coup in 2007 was largely a local affair, foreign parties got involved after the end of the war in 2009. It was the Colombo embassies that insisted that Ranil Wickremasinghe should stand down and make way for a common candidate. The involvement of foreign parties would have brought in money and influence into the project but it proved fatal to the yahapalanites by generating unrealistic expectations of more foreign largess after they come into power. Some ill-conceived actions that the yahapalanites did in expectation of a massive influx of foreign aid to the country following the coup such as stopping all Chinese funded projects and promising massive handouts to the public, finally proved fatal to the yahapalana project.
No plan on what to do after capturing power
Nobody had the foggiest idea as to what they were going to do after they capture power. It was as if a band of illiterate, unwashed pirates had boarded a ship and found it to be full of treasure and damsels. Rapine and the enjoyment of the fruits of power was the only item on the agenda. The UNP for its part, had been so envious of the achievements of the Rajapaksas that their only aim in life was to prove that the Rajapaksas had not done as well as they claimed. They changed the figures published by the Central Bank in a flat footed move to prove that the economy had not grown as fast as claimed under the Rajapaksas. They stopped all work on the projects initiated by the Rajapksas, stored paddy at the Mattala airport and stopped bunkering operations at the Hambantota harbor on the claim that it was making losses. If the UNP had taken over what the Rajapaksas had left and managed it judiciously, the story may have been different. But their inferiority complex over-determined everything else.
Pre-occupation with persecuting the vanquished
To say that the yahapalana government had an obsession with persecuting the Rajapaksas and their followers would be an understatement. An Anti-Corruption Committee was set up under Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe along with a specialized police unit the FCID which existed for the sole purpose of carrying out investigations referred to them by yahapalana politicians. From 2015 till 2019, what the public heard most often from yahapalana politicians was the pledge to put the Rajapaksas behind bars. Even today, many yahapalana leaders think their present plight is because they failed to put the Rajapaksas behind bars and end their political careers. They don’t seem to realize that the public backlash would have been much worse if their schemes had succeeded. The public reacts very negatively to leaders who show themselves to be unhinjed and demented and that is exactly how the yahapalana leaders presented themselves to the public.
Over reliance on lies and deception
From the very beginning, the yahapalana campaign against the Rajapaksas was based on lies and falsehoods. A factor which contributed immensely to the yahapalana campaign of lies and deception was that the decade of Rajapaksa rule was the very period in which social media like facebook made their appearance and the use of smart phones and computers became commonplace. The lies propagated by the yahapalana cabal over the new media took a toll on the Rajapaksa government. The tactics used to manipulate public opinion over such media was new to Sri Lanka at the time. Today however people are more aware of such manipulation. Almost everybody knows now that there are paid internet activists who make posts for a fee. The yahapalanites spent a lot of time and effort on their army of internet activists. Even in the run-up to the presidential election and the just concluded parliamentary election, the posts on all websites were mostly against the Rajapaksas. But the result of the election shows that such tactics do not work any longer. The people now know how to distinguish a fake comment from a genuine one.
Buying votes with handouts
One of the most self destructive acts of the yahapalanites was to buy votes with huge salary increases for government servants and reduction of fuel prices. They lied their way into power at the presidential election but could not hope to repeat that at the parliamentary election. So they followed through with some of the main pledges they had given at the presidential election in order to win the parliamentary election. This was something the yahapalana government never recovered from. Having increased government expenditure and reduced government revenue at the same time, at some point they had to start collecting the money to offset those losses. Thus 2015 became the year of government largesse and 2016 became the year of increased taxes.
The first yahapalana finance minister Ravi Karunanayake became popular when he increased salaries and reduced the price of fuel and certain essential foodstuffs and he became unpopular when taxes were increased to meet that additional expenditure. After he was forced out of the finance ministry, his yahapalana colleagues sold him down the river, claiming credit for the increase in salaries and reduction in the price of fuel while palming off the blame for the increases in taxes on Ravi K. It was every man for himself and may the devil take the hindmost.
Gross economic mismanagement
It was clear that the yahapalana leaders were expecting huge injections of foreign money into Sri Lanka after the defeat of the Rajapaksas. Given the enthusiasm shown by foreign powers to overthrow the Rajapaksas and the amount of money spent by foreign powers for that purpose, it was perhaps excusable for the yahapalanites to expect that billions in foreign aid was to follow. The foreign powers that backed the yahapalana project for their part would never have thought that Sri Lanka would turn into a basket case overnight. At the time of the regime change in January 2015, Sri Lanka was the fastest growing economy in Asia after China. All that the new government had to do was to carry on from where the Rajapaksas were forced to stop and there would have been no need to bankroll Sri Lanka from overseas.
Gross economic mismanagement led to plummeting growth rates, a plummeting exchange rate, a vast increase of debt as the yahapalana government struggled to meet the costs of all the handouts they gave to get themselves elected. One of the most deleterious effects of yahapalan misrule was the vast increase in foreign currency debt. When no foreign aid was forthcoming from their foreign masters, the yahapalana government resorted to foreign commercial borrowings. Since the market was prepared to give, the yahapalana government took, with all restraint thrown to the winds.
The Central Bank bond scam shows the yahapalana government at its incompetent worst. By what stretch of the imagination did they think they would get away with it, when so many officials of the Central bank saw them doing it? Furthermore, in order to carry out a crooked deal they embarked on a course of action which would drive interest rates upward and have a negative impact on the entire economy. What drove the economy into the ground during the yahapalana years was sheer incompetence and nothing else. All other countries including India, Bangladesh, Germany and the USA were doing very well throughout those years from 2015 to 2019 and only Sri Lanka was going downhill.
Cynical disregard for propriety
The yahapalana government had little or no regard for the optics of what they were doing. They put off the local government elections for three years, regardless of the negative impression that such postponement of elections creates in the minds of the public. In 2017, just as the provincial councils were to stand automatically dissolved, they suddenly brought committee stage amendments to a Bill that had been introduced in Parliament earlier to increase women’s representation in the PCs and changed the system of elections to the provincial councils for no other reason than to avoid holding the elections. So desperate were they to prevent PC elections from being held that when the Attorney General said that the Bill had to be passed with a two thirds majority, the government bargained with the smaller political parties in the corridors of Parliament and agreed to increase the proportional representation quota from 40% to 50%.
Thus the local government elections system which was passed just weeks earlier, has a 40% PR quota while the PC elections system has a 50% PR quota. The system of elections to the local government institutions was also changed by committee stage amendments brought to a Bill that had been introduced in Parliament earlier, to correct some technical errors in the Local Government Elections Act. When President Sirisena dissolved Parliament, instead of taking on the challenge of an election head on, as any self respecting political party would have, the yahapalana government and their partners in the yahapalana opposition went to courts and got the dissolution annulled and hailed that as a triumph for democracy. They were oblivious to the fact that the people were watching all this. The people take a very dim view of the postponement of elections as was seen in 1977. Little wonder that every election held after 2015 was a landslide for the SLPP.
Gross abuse of the minority communities
From the very beginning, the entire yahapalana regime change project was predicated on organizing block votes against the Rajapaksas combining the vast majority of the minority vote with a minority of the majority community vote. The Tamil vote block was organized by giving them unrealistic pledges to the effect that if Sirisena is elected to power all Tamil aspirations will become a reality overnight. This was akin to the TULF slogan of 1977 – If you vote for the TULF today, you will have Eelam tomorrow! Until around 2012, many Muslims were with the Rajapaksa camp and they had to be got out of that marriage and lined up against the Rajapaksas. In 2012, a group of monks were taken to Norway at the expense of the Norwegian government and six months after they returned, an anti-halal movement materialized out of nowhere and transmogrified over time into a generalized anti-Muslim campaign which culminated in the Aluthgama clashes of 2014.
Former JHU activist Asoka Abeygunasekera in his book titled ‘Yuga Peraliya’ on the 2015 regime change project recounted how the JHU had sent Ven Hedigalle Wimalasara Thera into the Bodu Bala Sena to act as Gnanasara Thera’s handler and to get what they wanted done by the BBS. If the Tamil voters were deceived and organised, the Muslim voters were flogged and organized. One strategically taken photograph was used to convince the Muslim voters that Gotabhaya Rajapaksa was in league with the monks formenting anti-Muslim sentiments. The Mulsim political leaders knew fully well what was going on, but for their own parochial interests, they went along with the yahapalana project. The Tamils and Muslims were thus lined up for a power project and used for the purposes of others. Five years later, the end result of all this has been that the majority Sinhalese have consciously lined up to prevent such manipulation.
Lack of proper leadership
All of the above indicates that the yahapalana project did not have proper leadership. It was just a collection of unprincipled opportunists who got together to overthrow a successful government and grab power for themselves. No self respecting political leader would have engaged in the kind of underhand manoeuvers and charlatanism that led to the regime change project of 2015. Once they had grabbed power through various subterfuges, they thought they had discovered the way to remain in power for ever by combining the vast majority of the minority vote with a minority of the majority vote to win presidential elections.
The reason why some yahapalana ministers and leaders went out of their way to insult the Sinhalese and the Buddhists was to show the minority communities that they were with the minorities and against the majority community. When the Easter Sunday bombings took place in such a backdrop, that was the clearest sign to the people that the yahapalana government because of its politics was in no position to deal with any threat coming from within the minority communities or from overseas. The five years of the yahapalana nightmare were by far the blackest chapter in Sri Lankan politics. We may have faced adversity in earlier times due to world crises such as the food and fuel crises of the 1970s or the terrorism of the LTTE and the JVP, but never has the country suffered like this due to bad politics.
- News Advertiesment
See Kapruka’s top selling online shopping categories such as Toys, Grocery, Flowers, Birthday Cakes, Fruits, Chocolates, Clothing and Electronics. Also see Kapruka’s unique online services such as Money Remittence,News, Courier/Delivery, Food Delivery and over 700 top brands. Also get products from Amazon & Ebay via Kapruka Gloabal Shop into Sri Lanka.
JVP Select Committee member alleges Indian hand in Easter Sunday blasts
Party leaders in parliament have asked the government several times to table it in the House but the government has not yet done so. We heard the media spokesperson of the Attorney General stating on TV that the Attorney General too has not yet received the report. Colombo Archbishop Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith says that he too has not received a copy yet. The President is keeping the most important commission report of his life to himself. We believe that people have the right to know what’s in it and it should be released. There is a yet-to-be-identified force behind the Easter attacks.
by Saman Indrajith
JVP Central Committee and Politburo member and former Kalutara District MP, Dr Nalinda Jayatissa, says that it was India’s Research and Analysis Wing who masterminded the Easter Sunday terror attacks and there was no substantial evidence to prove any ISIS link to the Zahran Hashim’s group that carried out the attack.
The final report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) into the Easter Sunday attacks should clear this situation. If not, the government cannot escape the blame of a cover-up, Dr Jayatissa said in an interview with The Sunday Island.
Q: The final report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) into the Easter Sunday attacks was handed over to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. While the government keeps on saying that it would be released, the opposition keeps on demanding to see it. You were a member of the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) that investigated the issue. The PCoI took a longer time than PSC to complete the investigation. Do you think that PCoI report may at least identify those truly responsible for the heinous crime that killed 268 and wounded more than 500?
The report yet to be released is that of the most important PCoI that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa had appointed. It is the most important because the Easter Sunday carnage was the event that brought him to politics. He was not looking to come into active politics before that. That incident helped them to come to power. They came to power promising to probe the Easter Sunday terror attacks and punish those responsible. There had been lot of difficulties and limits to the PSC probe. Those now in the SLPP were then in the United Opposition and they boycotted the PSC. They created many obstructions. They even shouted that we should not summon intelligence and military officers saying that our action would result in exposing those officers’ identities and put them in danger.
But the PCoI did not have such limits. They summoned more officers of both intelligence agencies and security establishments and some of them later gave TV interviews too. However, in our investigation we identified who had failed to prevent the terror attack and why and how such extremist groups came into existence in this country. We think that a PCoI should do better than a PSC because all intelligence officers, CID and Terrorist Investigation Division officers, came before the PCoI and testified. We hope that the PCoI report will expose who was actually behind the terror attacks other than Zahran and his colleagues who exploded themselves. Otherwise the report will not have anything new.
This report would be different and unique only if it exposes who were really behind Zahran’s group. The PCoI report was handed over to President Rajapaksa on Feb 1. Thereafter three cabinet meetings have been held but yet the report has not been placed before the Cabinet. We do not accept the excuse that it’s too large a report to be submitted to the Cabinet. That’s a lame excuse.
Party leaders in parliament have asked the government several times to table it in the House but the government has not yet done so. We heard the media spokesperson of the Attorney General stating on TV that the Attorney General too has not yet received the report. Colombo Archbishop Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith says that he too has not received a copy yet. The president is keeping the most important commission report of his life to himself. We believe that people have the right to know what’s in it and it should be released. There is a yet-to-be-identified force behind the Easter attacks.
We heard former CID Senior DIG Ravi Seneviratne saying in his testimony that there must be someone above Zahran Hashim who masterminded the attack. SSP Shani Abeysekera was the Director CID at the time of the Easter Sunday attack and was also the first officer tasked with conducting the investigations. He has said that Zahran was not the mastermind because the leader of a terrorist group has never been a suicide bomber blasting himself in any terrorist attack anywhere in the world. So the President is bound by the responsibility of revealing the true mastermind in this incident.
Q: Investigators are of the opinion that the Easter Sunday attacks had the support of a foreign force. Do you also think so?
I saw on TV last week MP Dilan Perera, who is a senior of the SLFP and a former minister, stating that there was direct or indirect involvement of India behind the Easter Sunday attacks. I consider it a serious statement. If a government MP says that India was behind the attacks, then there should be some basis for his statement. Apart from that, there is other information promoting the same suspicion being discussed in society. There are reasons for that. It was Indian intelligence who provided the first piece of comprehensive information about the attack weeks prior to that incident. Their information said that the Indian High Commission in Colombo was also one of the targets.
Yet it was revealed at the PSC that the Indian High Commission never asked for additional security despite the threat. It was also revealed at the PSC that no additional security has been accorded to the Indian Defense Secretary who had suddenly visited Sri Lanka for a one-day visit on April 08, 2019. Those who were involved in this attack had not been to Middle Eastern or other countries where ISIS had a presence. They had only been to India. In addition, Zahran’s group did not have an armoury. There was a stock of weapons that was found at Wanathavillu. A detonator with the least capacity had been used for the test explosion of a motorcycle at Kattankudy four days before the Easter Sunday attacks.
It was a weapon that had been taken away in Oct, 2018 from Vavunathivu that was later used to shoot at Kabir Hashim’s secretary at Kegalle in March 2019, five months later. That shows that the Zahran’s group did not have explosives or firearms in large quantity as it is in the case of a terror group. Even after the terror attacks, the CID or any other security agency has not been able to find any armoury belonging to them until now. Even in the PCoI facts had been revealed about the hotel rooms and banquet halls that had been hired by the Zahran’s group but no revelations about any weapons or explosives. So a group which possesses very little fire power carries out terrorist attacks exploding eight very powerful bombs resulting in such a loss. Then there should be another force behind them to supply what was used. In the subsequent Sainthamaruthu attack, 16 persons were killed. Pualsthini Rajendran alias Sarah Jasmine, who survived that attack, fled to India by a boat from Mannar. However, we have not yet seen the Sri Lankan government asking from India to extradite her despite the fact that she has lot of important information.
Indian National Security Advisor Ajith Doval visited this country and then its foreign minister Jaishankar visited Sri Lanka but not on any of those occasions had our government asked India to hand over Sarah to our investigators. President Rajapaksa soon after his election visited India. Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa conducted many zoom and video call conferences with his Indian counterpart Modi. We can also see the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo playing a very influential political role. But we have not seen the Lankan government asking India to hand over Sarah to our investigators. Not even the PCoI asked for her.
As we know, Zahran’s wife had told the PCoI that Sarah knew more about the dealings of the Zahran group than she because Sarah was the wife of the suicide bomber who had attacked the St. Sebastian’s Church in Katuwapitiya. When this question was posed to Public Security Minister Sarath Weerasekera recently, he replied that before asking for the extradition, we must make sure that Sarah was still alive and DNA testing on Sarah was still being done. That is not true because giving evidence before the PCoI on July 21, 2020 the then Ampara SSP Samantha Wijesekera testified that they conducted DNA tests on those who had been killed at Sainthamaruthu but Sarah was not among the dead.
Sarah’s mother giving evidence before PCoI stated on July 25, 2020 that Sarah did not die but fled. There is no need to conduct DNA or delay. The Public Security Minister’s position is only a part of a campaign to cover up for Sarah who knows India’s involvement. It is further established when former Minister Dilan Perera clearly stated that India was behind the Easter Sunday attacks.
Q: None who attended the PSC mentioned any Indian involvement. Testimony of some of those who gave evidence before the PSC was taken in camera. Has anyone testified before the PSC of any Indian involvement?
No. It is Dilan Perera’s recent statement on TV that said so clearly in public. But anyone can guess that an Islamic outfit of the size and capabilities of Zahran’s group alone cannot organize a series of terror attacks of this nature. They had the backing of a force which had access to high powered explosives, intelligence and technology. It is up to the President or the PCoI to reveal the real perpetrators. If the upcoming report too says that there were security lapses because of the rivalry between Ranil Wickremesinghe and Maithriapala Sirisena, and that Hemasiri Fernando and Pujith Jayasundera could not prevent the attacks even with information in their hands, then it is clear that the government wants to protect the real culprits of this crime.
Q: Suppose that theory of Indian connection is true. Then how could it be viewed against what we are seeing today in politics where Indian involvements in the Colombo port and many other places in the country have raised many concerns?
Actually this incident has more political repercussions than military or security issues. From 2008 to 2015 China established its presence in the Indian Ocean. It acquired Port City, CICT terminal, six acres of land next to the Colombo Harbour and involved itself in development projects. China included Sri Lanka in its One Belt One Road program. This raised concerns of not only India but also of the US. They wanted to send Mahinda Rajapaksa home and did so. Mahinda Rajapaksa himself told Port unionists that it was India that sent him home in 2015. However, his successor Wickremesinghe-Sirisena government too did not deliver the expected results. That was why India got its intelligence to mastermind the Easter Sunday attacks.
A march, a tweet, some angst and mild sabre-rattling
by Malinda Seneviratne
If something deserves to be called ‘Event of the Week’ it would be the ‘Pothuvil to Poligandy (P2P) March’ which ended on Sunday, February 7. At the end of the march there were around 2,000 people. Most significantly, it was an event that saw the participation of both Tamils and Muslims. The basic differences in grievances were obviously negated by a felt need to be united against, let’s say, a perceived common enemy, the Government to some, ‘Sinhala Chauvinism’ to others.
It marked also, as D B S Jeyaraj has mentioned in his weekly column, a return of sorts to non-violent protests. Now it is not that all Tamil and Political action was violent. There have been all kinds of non-violent protests even during the conflict. However, this was a sustained, determined and even colorful affirmation of a politics that harked back to a different time. ‘The Satyagraha of 1961,’ is what Jeyaraj was reminded of. There are two interesting statements that are related to this march. First we had the government withdrawing STF security assigned to TNA MP M.A. Sumanthiran. Sumanthiran retorted, ‘if something happens to me the Government will be held responsible.’ Now the agitation of the man does seem misplaced considering that he was involved in a five-day march (ok, he may not have be ‘on the moving spot’ all five days, but still! Was he not worried about security? Also, Sumanthiran has openly supported the LTTE, indulged heavily in Eelam-speak as well as celebration of the terrorists. He would do well to reflect on the fate of others who came before who did the very same thing, especially the leader of the TULF, Appapillai Amirthalingam. Amirthalingam spouted rhetoric which was like an endless nutritional feed to extremism. The beast, in his insatiable hunger, at one point did much more than bite the hand that fed it. One hopes that things don’t snowball to a repeat of all that, but Sumanthiran, having seen what happens to hands thrust into fires ought to keep his in his pockets. Nevertheless, withdrawing security granted on a threat perception is an overreaction.The second is a hilarious tweet from the tweet-happiest diplomat in Colombo, Alaina B Teplitz: ‘#Peacefulprotests is an important right in any #democracy and significant, legitimate concerns should be heard. I saw Tamil media coverage of the march from Pottuvil to Point Pedro and wondered why it was not more widely covered by Colombo-based media?’She has a point. The English, Sinhala and Tamil media have different preferences that have little to do with newsworthiness. Perhaps it is all about the target audience; after all there’s a reason why entertainment value has framed reporting and presentation, why sensationalism has become an important driver and so on. This holds for different media houses as well; owners have agendas. Nevertheless, there is a serious problem if matters of political significance are down-played or ignored altogether, one has to question the sense of responsibility of the particular media institutions.On the other hand, we cannot ignore the ‘Season of Vexatious Persecution’ (i.e. the annual human rights circus in Geneva) which is all about whipping things up from December to February. Now it could be a coincidence that P2P was organized at this particular moment, but few will buy it considering the personalities involved and their political history. The Teplitz tweet only serves to add credence to the view that this was just another side show of the above mentioned circus. The tweet also indicates an important fact: Teplitz is running out of slogans. Before we get to that, let’s have a say on the key words — the hash tagged ‘peaceful protests,’ ‘democracy’ and ‘legitimate concerns.’ It is downright laughable for a US diplomat to talk about such things given that country’s absolute rubbishing of such things, domestically and internationally. That aside, there’s the fact that Teplitz has been pained to the point that she has to whine about media coverage. Is it that a pet project directly or indirectly sponsored, planned and executed, didn’t move as many Tamils and Muslims as was envisaged? We didn’t hear Muslim and Tamil leaders complaining about news coverage. Have they deferred that kind of task to Teplitz? If that’s the case, who is the pawn or who are the pawns here? Is it Teplitz? Are they Tamil and Muslim leaders who in their wisdom believe that the best bet to get grievances, real or imagined, sorted and aspirations, reasonable or outrageous, fulfilled is to support the US in securing strategic objectives in Sri Lanka? If such happens (not a certainty, certainly) do they believe they’ll get some crumbs off the table? And what does all this have to say about the agency of Tamil and Muslim citizens? Are they too pawns? Indeed, are all peoples of all communities pawns in games where they are sacrificed at will? Jeyaraj sees in P2P ‘a remarkable show of solidarity and unity’ between the Tamil and Muslim communities. He does exaggerate about the numbers (tens of thousands, he says) and deliberately introduces the ‘Tamil-speaking’ qualifier which Tamil nationalists have often used to rope in rhetorically ‘The Muslims’ to their various political projects. Jeyaraj remembers 1961 but has forgotten the late eighties when M H M Ashraff (in)famously stated that even if Prabhakaran abandons Eelam, he would not. He dialed down the rhetoric over the next decade, but what did Prabhakaran do to the (Tamil-speaking) Muslims, has Jeyaraj forgotten? The LTTE ethnically cleansed the Jaffna Peninsula of Muslims. The LTTE turned one in ten Muslims into refugees, slaughtering dozens, driving them off their homes, seizing properties etc. Muslim leaders cannot pretend to be unaware of that history. Muslim Affairs, if you will, featured in other ways over the week. Recently returned to Parliament, Ven Athureliye Rathana Thero presented a private member’s bill to repeal the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act. Justice Minister Ali Sabry who prior to entering Parliament championed the notion ‘One Country, One Law,’ responded by saying ‘steps are being taken to amend the Muslim Laws and that a Cabinet Paper had already been presented in that regard.’Elaborating, Sabry said that the Cabinet Paper sought to amend the minimum marriageable age of Muslim girls to 18, to permit women to act as Kathis and also to make it necessary to get the consent of Muslim women when they get married.That’s it? That makes it ‘One Country, One Law’? Sabry must do a serious rethink on what he says and does and the meaning of the terms he uses (so loosely!).
He is correct when he says that ‘if the personal laws were to be abolished, all the personal laws such as Muslim Laws, Kandyan law and Thesawalamai Law should be abolished altogether.’ ‘Through a social discussion,’ he adds. There’s been enough social discussion, he knows this. One-country-one-law would certainly call for abolishing all customary laws. His concern seems to be limited to correcting existing laws that privilege Muslim men over Muslim women. That’s not even scratching the surface of the problem though!
Here are a question for Sabry: Are there plans to abolish polygamy (can’t have it for some and not others, no?)? Here’s another: The Special Parliamentary Committee on Extremism appointed by the previous administration presented a report in February 2020 recommending extensive measures with respect to Muslim laws as well as ‘educational’ institutions — have you read it? Are you in agreement? If so, what have you done so far? Are you planning to defer everything to the experts tasked to draft a new constitution? What are those experts doing by the way? When will we see a draft? And finally, what exactly do you understand by ‘One country, one law’? Let’s have some answers, please.
This week also saw Wimal Weerawansa making some news. He openly advocated a prominent and even principal role for Gotabaya Rajapaksa in the SLPP leadership. He was taken on by the General Secretary of the SLPP, Sagara Kariyawasam who questioned Wimal’s rights to talk of the SLPP since he’s not a member. Wimal retorted that people in the SLPP talk of other parties. Sagara wondered what Wimal’s fate would be had he and his party contested independently. Wimal pointed out that Sagara, a national list MP, hadn’t even contested.
Light banter at best. Some sections of the Opposition have salivated, naturally. They believe and talk of ‘a rift!’ in the Rajapaksa camp, friction between the brothers (Wimal’s antipathies to Basil being well known).Too early to conclude such of course, but as debating points go, both Wimal and Sagara have scored. What this ‘scoring’ says about the future of the SLPP is of course left to be seen. There’s bound to be differences of opinion in any political coalition. If everyone was on the same page there wouldn’t be a coalition in the first place. You win some, you lose some — this is something that junior or weaker partners know very well (ask Prof Tissa Vitarana of the LSSP).
The so-called ‘smaller parties’ did make a lot of noise regarding the East Container Terminal issue. It seems, as of now, that the ‘big party’ listened. Whether they’ll still have the ‘big ear’ regarding the West Container Terminal is left to be seen. On the other hand, we know the story about the dog and the tail, no offense to canines or tails.
Politicians and political parties are about power and about elections. If, for example, Champika Ranawaka and the Jathika Hela Urumaya, having broken ranks with the UPFA decided to go it alone and not join the UNP-led coalition as they did, where would Ranawaka be today, one might ask. Indeed is it not such questions that persuaded him to resign from the JHU and become a 100% SJBer, one could also ask. There are no elections in sight, but when they do come around, all parties big and small will revisit ‘coalition’ and calculate the impact of decisions (and rhetoric) on electability.
For now, though, noises can and will be made. The likes of Wimal would have to pick their battles and select decibel levels. That said, his point about the distance between president and parliament on account of political sway within the party is valid. It goes without saying that the effectiveness of a program sometimes comes down to parliamentary weight which of course can be deployed best if the executive has a degree of control. The President either doesn’t have it or cannot count on it or imagines he doesn’t need it. He could ask his brothers, both veterans in this respect. That however might mean give-and-take, if we were to believe the notion that the brothers are bound by blood but not about vision.
India, meanwhile, is not happy, going by statements issued regarding the East Container Terminal. India cannot be happy about the ‘Chinese Footprint’ whose size was considerably expanded by the previous government by virtually handing over the Hambantota Port to China. India cannot be happy about energy projects given to the Chinese. India cannot be happy about the scheduled visit by Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan and MoUs that are said to be signed and/or renewed.
India speaks of Sri Lanka ‘reneging’ on an MoU. However, India forgets that MoUs are not exactly agreements, signed after crossing the t’s and dotting the i’s. They are by definition non-binding and amenable to change. Circumstances can change and changing circumstances have to be taken into account.
If an agreement causes political instability it would be foolish for a government to go ahead with it. If, prior to inking an agreement, one party (India in this case) stands with a country that seems hell bent on bullying Sri Lanka (the USA in this case), then it would be silly for that party to assume that the counterpart be oblivious to such developments. If one party has in the part ‘reneged’ (as India has with respect to the Indo-Lanka Accord which from the get-go was a product of shamelessness bullying and moreover was heavily slanted in India’s favor), then that party should be careful before using the word.
And on the subject of ‘foreign affairs,’ we have Dinesh Gunawardena claiming that Sri Lanka is not afraid of the soon to be tabled resolution in Geneva. There are 47 members in the Human Rights Council (HRC). The Minister of Foreign Affairs cannot be saying ‘the majority are with us.’ The brave words could probably mean ‘we expect this, we know the consequences, we know it’s the work of nations wallowing in a cesspool of bias, we know that they’re hinting at sanctions, we know what the UN itself has found out about the impact of sanctions in other countries, especially Venezuela in recent times, we know there’s talk of taking things to the General Assembly and then the Security Council, we know who our friends are and more importantly who our enemies are, and we know what it takes to secure sovereignty to the extent possible.’ Dinesh Gunawardena might not elaborate in the above manner. After all, he is required to be ‘diplomatic’ although he is not averse to calling a spade a spade. ‘Geneva’ is just over a week from now. A resolution is likely to be tabled. It is likely that it will be passed. Most importantly, it will show us what India’s ‘neighborhood first’ foreign policy is really about.
Dayan Jayatilleka and the Opposition Reset
Hobbes and Locke:
When both the Sinhala Alt-Right and neoliberal Right start attacking you, you know you’re occupying a centrist moral high ground. Appointing Dr Dayan Jayatilleka as the Samagi Jana Balavegaya’s Senior International Relations Advisor – no Junior Advisor as of yet – portends, I think, a world of possibility, for an Opposition bruised and battered by a quarter-century of self-manslaughter. The appointment as it stands doesn’t really amount to much, unless you place it in its proper context: what we have is a key theoretician, the only theoretician who can pose a credible enough challenge to what the government is doing. I do not necessarily agree with everything he has said and written over the last few months, but I do agree that the Opposition needs a radical reset. And it’s becoming more and more clear that the man best capable of handling the surgery to see that through is Dr Jayatilleka.
The problem with the SJB is that it is acting more and more like a many-headed hydra facing a rapacious but determined behemoth. To match the behemoth, the Opposition must meet it headfirst; it must critique the state’s more questionable actions while matching its better ideals. In three areas it should seek to go beyond the UNP’s paradigm: domestic economics, foreign relations, and the constitution. It’s no coincidence that Dr Jayatilleka’s critique of the government rests on these three areas, and it’s no coincidence that it’s from those vantage points that his critics – from BOTH the Alt-Right and the neoliberal Right – continue to attack and denigrate him. The first strategy must therefore be to purge the Opposition, not in the old authoritarian sense, but in the sense of removing remnants of what Dr Jayatilleka calls Ranilism: that failed neoliberal, anti-Presidential yahapalanist policy.
The yahapalana neoliberal project failed, but not because Sri Lankans are averse to a liberal polity. It all depends on what kind of liberal policies the yahapalana government was trying to dish out. At the centre of its project was a fatal disjuncture between its populist roots and its avowed policy of “liberalising and globalising” (Mangala Samaraweera, Budget Speech 2017). People voted for a social market economy; what they got was anything but. In other words the yahapalanists failed to reconcile the timeless rift between social liberalism (with its emphasis on state interventionism) and economic liberalism (with its emphasis on the rollback of the state). High on principles, and lofty ones, it floundered. For that reason, we cannot go back to 2015. We should not try to do so.
Given this, how should the SJB craft its policies in those areas? On the domestic economic front, the SJB must abandon, totally and considerably, that earlier policy of liberalising and globalising. It must think of production, since the biggest, most persistent problem facing this country’s economy today is its absence of a proper manufacturing base. It cannot hope to achieve this with piecemeal solutions; there must be state intervention, what Dr Dayan calls “a new, New Deal, Rooseveltian-Keynesian.” I am no economist, so I can’t really detail the specifics of this new New Deal. I do know, however, what it should not be: the old UNP-yahapalanist neoliberal paradigm. The new policy must be progressive, state-led though not state-monopolised, and driven by local manufacture.
Of course, in all fairness to Dr Jayatilleka, I should point out that this may not necessarily be what he has in mind or what he advocates. That is why I disagree with him when he ponders the impracticality of import controls, since local production requires “imported inputs, while a middle-class society in an MDG country, cannot sustain itself without imported consumer goods, including essentials.” Far from being a minus point against restrictions, I believe the very fact that we import consumer goods, even for local production, necessitates a cohesive substitution strategy that, while directed by the state, should be phased out.
On the foreign policy front, relations with India must be patched up immediately, while the anti-China lobby must be discouraged. To be fair by the current regime, notwithstanding the anti-Indian comments of certain Ministers it has more or less attempted to stick to its “India First” policy, even attempting the impossible: the lease-out of the East Coast Terminal to an Indian investor in the teeth of opposition from the government’s own ranks.
I don’t think it feasible or advisable, however, for the regime to have gone to such lengths to prove its India First credentials, and to Dr Dayan’s credit he critiques it extensively as well: it will, he observes, antagonise China, forcing it to try leaving behind a bigger footprint on the country. Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s interlude with Tony Blinken makes it clear that Indo-US ties will only strengthen across the board against the China Factor under the new administration in Washington. Sri Lanka simply cannot afford to ignore this, but then it must not use geopolitical imperatives to go overboard when dealing with neighbours.
A clear consensus has arisen, especially among the hardliners in the regime and nationalists within the Opposition, that the ECT deal should not have gone ahead. Dr Dayan is agreed on this point, but to what extent is the Opposition in the SJB also agreed to it? We’re getting mixed signals from Sajith Premadasa’s party. Symbolically enough the tweets and messages congratulating the government vis-à-vis the ECT deal have been, not from any government figure, but from the Opposition. The SJB has mostly tilted between reluctant acquiescence (they were with the UNP when the agreement was drafted, after all) and hysterical rhetoric (Harin Fernando’s claim that the Adanis to whom the ECT was leased will take business from Sri Lanka to a port they have developed in Mundra, a claim that was shown to be untrue by N. Sathya Moorthy in a report on the deal). This is not how it should be.
The ECT deal, however, isn’t all there is to what course Sri Lanka should take regarding its foreign policy. Another issue is Geneva, the UNHRC bomb. Dr Jayatilleka is adamantly of the belief that inasmuch as the government blundered by withdrawing from Resolution 30/1, it was the yahapalana regime’s fault for cosponsoring it in the first place.
This runs counter to elements within the UNP and even SJB that still view Resolution 30/1 as a foreign policy success; Harsha de Silva’s lengthy though well detailed speech in parliament two months ago on the question of the government’s foreign policy did the rounds in every quarter, but then ended up referring to the March 2015 Geneva session on a positive note. Not so, Dr Jayatilleka warned not too long afterwards: any reform-and-reset program in the Opposition must let go of the belief that Resolution 30/1 was a success, and recognise it for the unmitigated disaster it was.
On the constitution front, the way forward for the Opposition seems clear: it must abandon any rhetoric of getting rid of the Executive Presidency. For Dr Jayatilleka, the problem with the 20th Amendment isn’t so much the fact that it restores the Presidency as it is the degree to which it entrenches it. There is a clear difference: the objective of any practical-minded and national Opposition, he implies, must be, not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, but to retain the baby sans the bathwater. Ergo, constitutional reforms must a) not abolish or substantively reduce the powers of the EP, and b) go as far as permissible and practical vis-à-vis devolution of power, within and not beyond the 13th Amendment.
Sri Lanka’s political landscape, as it rests, is occupied by Lockean liberals and Hobbesian sovereigntists. The former are high on ideals, low on execution, while the latter are all for execution, not so much for ideals. To take a middle-ground between these two must be the aim of every self-respecting Opposition, and it seems as though Dr Jayatilleka has, despite my reservations with some of his policy recommendations, got it. We need an alternative to both neoliberal think-tanks and ultranationalist-technocratic fora. I believe the SJB has what it takes to go beyond its neoliberal roots, though I fear I’ll be proven wrong.
The solutions to Sri Lanka’s predicament must come from a left-of-centre, even Marxist, position; I believe in taking the latter course, but I also know what is practical and what is not, at least in Sri Lanka. The SJB does not stand out as a Marxist party, but then nor does the SLPP. Yet it must adroitly escape its neoliberal past, and for that, Dr Jayatilleka’s policy recommendations must be, if not unanimously, then at least considerably endorsed by the upper echelons of the party. I mean not just Sajith Premadasa, but also Harsha de Silva, Eran Wickramaratne, Buddhika Pathirana, Rajitha Senaratne, and Ajith Perera.
These ex-UNPers must realise that the old centre-right neoliberal paradigm no longer works. They must realise, in what they say and what they do, that such a paradigm must never be tried or tested out again. If getting the SJB and its officials to undergo this radical reset is all he does, I believe Dr Jayatilleka will have done his part. To reiterate yet again: there must be a purge, so that the SJB doesn’t end up as GR Lite or, worse, UNP Lite.
The writer can be reached at email@example.com